{"msg":"{\"proposalCid\":\"QmQ88aKM3m1ER3Aq6ot8UJSf4yWUb46rjquLo1eV18QrHT\",\"content\":\"This proposal merits further robust discussion about the concerns/goals highlighted above, and the balance of risks/incentives among vault operators, INTR holders and iBTC users. Considerations that should be addressed: \\n\\n(1) early vault operators should receive higher rewards for each $DOT risked as collateral than later-arriving vault operators given the higher risks (as were experienced with Kintsugi); \\n(2) If a parameter is added that restricts the rewards until a given threshold, then the proposal should address the proposed re-allocation of those withheld rewards throughout Year 1; \\n(3) APY assumptions used in calculating “appropriate” levels need incorporate that vault operators are assuming delta price risks on both $DOT and $INTR and \\n(4) every effort should be made to release the vaults with compelling use cases for iBTC.\\n\\nWe would suggest a nonlinear fee structure to reward early entrants and to create incentives to add further liquidity to maintain share of overall rewards. \\n\\nAs an example, start with 23 INTR per block until 45 iBTC is reached then increase to 31 INTR per block till 90 iBTC is reached and then 45.66 once the 135.57 is reached. [These numbers are open to discussion but the concept we believe aligns incentives]\",\"contentType\":\"markdown\",\"commenterNetwork\":\"interlay\",\"version\":\"2\",\"timestamp\":1656964864}","address":"wdAiGwBHni7xz4KSYVz7r363EKvrTYyFvSLfiaS9a5qF3CZ3c","signature":"0x220b5e426768fb12576bde3f6a474ba3e73c18840f6dd0bf1208333f0c9e725c9986c8c2752d324e2d7b2d1d0b4c6fdfb890fa197a71b704f957b813df973b84","version":"1"}